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Co'mment
THE DUAL-SYSTEM OF WATER RIGHTS
IN NEBRASKA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Nebraska, rights to waters in streams and lakes have been
regulated through a dual-system which utilizes both the riparian
doctrine of the common law and the statutory scheme of appropriative rights. Although the two doctrines are divergent in many
instances, the judiciary has recognized this and attempted to maintain a balance between them. Despite these efforts, however,
inconsistent principles of law developed over the years until finally
in Wasserburgerv. Coffee1 the Nebraska Supreme Court attempted
to reconcile the relative status of riparians and appropriators. In
doing so the court prescribed a flexible method of equitable balance
rather than a static formula of distribution. This article will give
a brief introduction to some of the problems faced in distributing
water rights under this dual-system, and will attempt to determine
what effect Wasserburger may have on these rights that are so
intimately linked with the prosperity of the state and Eill of its
citizens.
II.

COMMON-LAW RIPARIAN RIGHTS

At common law, those owning land contiguous to a stream or
lake had certain rights in the use of the water flowing through or
past their land. A right to the entire natural flow of a stream is
valuable and beneficial, but an economy cannot profitably permit
such a right unless there is an abundance of water.2 For this reason,
1 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966), modified, 180 Neb. 569, 144
N.W.2d 416 (1966).
2

For example, the California Constitution expressly provides: "It is
hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this
State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the
State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are
capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of
such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare. . . ." CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. The California court has
upheld the constitutionality of this section in enforcing the doctrine
of reasonable use. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist.,
3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2
CaL 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1936); Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673,

22 P.2d 5 (1933).

COMENTS
the "natural flow" doctrine of the riparian system was adopted only
in humid areas. But even with an abundance of water it was
necessary to assure a supply of water for the basic sustenance of
life. Therefore, domestic uses, which include water for drinking,
cooking and watering livestock,3 were considered paramount, and a
riparian could divert all the water needed for such uses. As to all
other uses, a riparian's rights were controlled by the doctrine of
"reasonable use." Under this doctrine "the quantity taken by an
individual riparian must be reasonable in relation to the needs of
all other riparians on the stream."4 "The riparian proprietor does
not own the water. He has the right only to enjoy the advantage of
a reasonable use of the stream as it flows by his land, subject to a
like right belonging to all other riparian proprietors." 5
Ownership of the waterflow of the stream remains with the
state; the riparian obtains only a use of the flow. However, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized this usufructuary right as
vested property:
A riparian's right to the use of the flow of the stream passing
through or by his land is a right inseparably annexed to the soil,
not as an easement or appurtenance, but as a part and parcel of
the land; such right being a property right, and entitled to protection as such, the same as private property rights generally. 6
Thus, a riparian holds a right that can be destroyed only through
the process of eminent domain, which necessitates that the taking
be for a public purpose and just compensation be paid. The riparian
7
can, of course, by his own act sever the water from the land.
This system of reasonable use became the common law of
Nebraska. The court in Wasserburger again affirmed the fact that
riparian rights still exist in the state, and that, although they must
be determined in relation to competing appropriative rights, the
doctrine of reasonable use remains as one-half of the dual-system of
water rights.

3 See Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 20 N3. L. R V. 1, 14 (1941).
4 Yeutter, A Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law,

44 NEB. L. REv. 11, 12 (1965). See also Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 20 NEB. L. REv. 1, 15 (1941); Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 504,

93 N.W. 713, 714 (1903).
5 Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 352, 93 N.W. 781, 790 (1903).
6 City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 588, 592,
243 N.W.774, 777 (1932).
7 See text following note 40 infra.
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III.

APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS

In 1877 the Nebraska legislature gave corporations formed for
the purpose of irrigation or use of waterpower the authority to
acquire rights-of-way for canals, dams and reservoirs through the
exercise of eminent domain.8 The Nebraska Supreme Court held
the statute impliedly gave individuals a right to acquire vested
interests in the use of water by construction of diversion works and
application of the water to a beneficial use2 It was uncertain, however, whether an individual appropriator could condemn the water
rights of others in the way public corporations were permitted to
do.' Regardless, this created a new system of water rights in Nebraska based upon first-in-time, first-in-right, and this prior appropriation doctrine henceforth would exist alongside the riparian
system to give the state a new dual-system. Problems of meshing
the two soon arose in those areas where water was inadequate, and
incompatible uses and rights became readily evident."
In 1889, twelve years after the first Act, the legislature enacted
the Rayner Irrigation Law, 1 2 which expressly adopted the doctrine
of prior appropriation. Anyone, not merely corporations, owning
land contiguous to or in the vicinity of a stream could acquire
appropriative rights by putting the water to beneficial use. The
Nebraska Supreme Court held, in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway,13
that subsequent to this Act no riparian rights could be acquired in
the state:
The irrigation act of 1889 abrogated in this state the commonlaw rule of riparian ownership in water, and substituted in lieu
thereof the doctrine of prior appropriation. This legislation could
not and did not have the effect of abolishing riparian rights which
had already accrued, but only of preventing the acquisition of
such rights in the future.14
It was apparent from the statute itself that existing riparian rights
were not destroyed in view of the proviso "that in all streams not
more than fifty feet in width the rights of the riparian proprietors
are not affected .... "15 This reference to riparian rights was
8 Neb. Laws p. 168 (1877).

9 Kearney Water & Elec. Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irr. Dist., 97 Neb. 139,
149 N.W. 363 (1914).
10 See text accompanying notes 44 & 45 infra.
11 Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB.L. REv. 385 (1950).
12 NEB. ComP. STAT., ch. 93a (1889).

Is Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
14 Id. at 357, 93 N.W. at 792.
15 This width was reduced to twenty feet in 1893. NEB. ComP. STAT.,
ch. 93a, § 1 (1893).

COAMENTS
declaratory of the common law;1 6 therefore, it follows that commonlaw riparian right still existed.
Finally, on April 4, 1895, a comprehensive water code was
enacted providing that "the water of every natural stream not
heretofor appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be the property
of the public, and is dedicated to the use of the people of the
state ... .,,17 Through this statute the legislature created the State
Board of Irrigation, now the Department of Water Resources, to
administer the appropriation of the state's water for beneficial
uses.18 This was the first clear evidence of legislative intent to
abolish future vesting of riparian rights. Therefore, 1895 should
be the cut-off date for the acquisition of riparian rights, and the
court so held in Wasserburger when it said: "In respect to parcels
which were severed from the public domain prior to April 4, 1895,
plaintiffs [riparians] may possess a superior right. Decisions in
conflict are overruled on this point."'' 9 Thus, Crawford Co. v.
Hathaway was overruled on this point2 O and riparian rights obtained between 1889 and 1895 are now definitely a part of the dual
appropriation-riparian system.
Since the statutory abrogation of riparian rights did not affect
pre-1895 common-law riparians who held vested property rights, a
taking of this right without just compensation would be "within
the prohibition of the constitution." 21 The cases which provide the
foundation for the judicial resolution of riparian-appropriative conflicts in Nebraska have clearly recognized that common-law riparian
rights which vested before the statutory restraint to subsequent
acquisition were still in force.22 Thus, they continued in existence
along with the newly created rights under the appropriation system.
16 Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 155, 141 N.W.2d 738, 743 (1966).
17 NEB. COmP. STAT., ch. 93a, § 5485 (1895). This same provision now
appears in NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202 (Reissue 1960).
18 For a listing of the agency's basic responsibilities see Yeutter, A
Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L.
Ray. 11, 19 (1965).
19 180 Neb. at 155, 141 N.W.2d at 743.
20 Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903). See text
accompanying note 14 supra.
21 Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irr. & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798,
807, 64 N.W. 239, 241 (1895).
22 Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 512, 93 N.W. 713, 717 (1903); Crawford
Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 343, 93 N.W. 781, 787 (1903) (although
holding that 1889 was the cut-off date). It has also been argued that
NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, §§ 4-6, adopted in 1920, abolished all riparian
rights. This contention is answered in Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180
Neb. 149, 155, 141 N.W.2d 738, 744 (1966); and Brief for Appellee at
43, Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966).
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IV.

PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON RIPARIAN LANDS

One requirement of pristine riparianism is that the water must
be used on riparian land. The Nebraska Supreme Court has discussed, at various times, the restrictions limiting the nature and
quantity of this land.23 In Wasserburger v. Coffee, Judge Smith
stated that riparian land has two characteristics. "The parcel must
include a part of the bed of a watercourse or lake, and no part of
the parcel is separted from the rest by intervening land in another's
possession. '24 For this proposition the court cited the Restatement
of Torts, which appears to be the only prior authority expressly
indicating such requirements. It is reasoned, in the Restatement,
that a riparian must have access to the stream in order to utilize
his water. In a state vesting ownership of the beds in private
individuals, such access could exist only if the individual had title
to the bed.25 Thus, if the Restatement rule is followed in Nebraska,
where title to the beds of non-navigable streams are held in private
ownership, 26 a conveyance of land adjacent to a stream or lake
would have to specifically include title to the bed in order for
riparian rights to vest.
In most instances, however, the ownership of the bed is acquired
upon conveyance of the bank. Grants of land on non-navigable
streams carry with them the grantee's exclusive right and title of
the bed to the center of the stream unless the terms of the grant
27
denote an intention that the conveyance terminate at the bank.
Even when the land is platted with a meander line on the bank by
the federal government, it has been held that ownership of the bed
still extends to the thread line. 28 So there could be a conveyance
of the bed without a specific declaration of such intent. However,
not even this ownership of the bed to the thread line was necessary
for riparian rights to vest. In Crawford Co. v. Hathaway it was
held that: "Land, to be riparian, must have the stream flowing over
it or along its borders."- 9 This is all that was required because
23

For a list of holdings prior to Wasserburger see Yeutter, A LegalEconomic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11,
15-17 (1966).

24

25

26
27

180 Neb. at 156, 141 N.W.2d at 744. The court cited Krimlofski v.
Matters, 174 Neb. 774, 119 N.W.2d 50 (1963), as the Nebraska case
supporting this rule.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 843 (1939).
Thies v. Platte Valley Public Power & hri. Dist., 137 Neb. 344, 289
N.W. 386 (1939).
McBride v. Whitaker, 65 Neb. 137, 90 N.W. 966 (1902), aff'd, 197 U.S.
510 (1904).

28

Higgins v. Addsen, 131 Neb. 820, 270 N.W. 502 (1936).

29

Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 354, 93 N.W. 781, 790 (1903).

COMMENTS
"riparian rights are a result of the possession of riparian land;
that is, land adjacent to water, not land underlying water."3 0 "The
ownership of the river is not the foundation of 'riparian rights'
properly so called, because the word 'riparian' is relative to the
bank, and not to the bed, of the stream.... ."3 Therefore, riparian

rights have existed with ownership of the bank alone.32 in fact,
riparian land was capable of having its boundaries extended by
accretion or reliction, or contracted by submersion, 33 without there
being any title to the bed. Thus it seems, dictum by the court in
Wasserburgerwould add a requirement for riparian rights to vest
that had never before been recognized in Nebraska.
This added requirement of bed ownership would be especially
significant if a riparian owner intended, for example, to continue irrigation but conveyed away his title to the bed to another
person who wished to purchase title to the bed in order to obtain
fishing,3 4 hunting or recreational rights, or for other such purposes.
"[I]f these parcels [bank and bed] are in separate ownership, it
would seem doubtful that the bed owner would acquire any
'riparian' rights, such as the right to use the surface, or to allow
his licensees to use the surface, in common with other riparians..

.

."3

This would follow from the fact that riparian rights

exist to benefit the land adjacent to the water. Therefore, when
the bed is conveyed away without the land, riparian rights would
not follow since the underlying purpose of benefit to land could not
be achieved.36 Also, under Wasserburger, since the bed has been
30 Johnson & Austin, RecreationalRights and Titles to Beds on Western
Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RES. J. 1, 6 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
Johnson & Austin).
31 Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 53 F. 970, 974
(C.C.D. Ind. 1893). "It must be remembered that riparian rights in
no way depend upon the ownership of the soil over which the water
flows, but upon the bank or banks down to the very edge of the
water itself." 1 C. S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION
AwD WATER RIGHTS 775 (2d ed. 1912).
32 It doesn't even make any difference as to how much of the riparian's
land is in contact with the stream. Joerger v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp.,
314 Cal. 630, 7 P.2d 706 (1932); Santos Omnes v. Crawford, 202 Cal.
766, 262 P. 722 (1922).

33 Yearsley v. Gipple, 104 Neb. 88, 175 N.W. 641 (1919).
34 The public does not have a right to fish in a private lake or stream.
NEB. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 224 (1930); NEB. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 400 (1942).
35 Johnson & Austin, supra note 30, at 6.
36 "The bed of the stream is not riparian land, nor is one owning only
the bed a riparian proprietor." S. C. WEL., WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES 836 (3d ed. 1911). Wiel also makes the argument that
the land must be contiguous in order to have access to the water, so
the bank is determinative. Id. at 837.
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severed from the bank, the land would lose its riparian status.
Thus, a logical result would be that no one would acquire or retain
riparian rights to that part of the stream or lake. Even if a clause
were included in the conveyance specifically stating that the riparian rights were to be retained on the land, this would not be
effective if the requirement of bed ownership were strictly enforced.
Such an outcome would be defeating the purpose of the riparian
doctrine; that is, to benefit that land remaining contiguous to the
stream or lake.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also has attempted to define
the physical boundaries of land capable of acquiring riparian
rights. For example, in Crawford v. Hathaway, the court determined that the riparian land should be limited to a single entry,
which was usually a government unit of forty acres, or in the case
of an irregular tract, a lot number from the government survey.Y
The basic rules governing riparian land, as enumerated in Wasserburger, are: 1) the "source of title" rule, by which riparian land
is limited to the smallest piece or parcel bordering on the stream
in the history of title of all the land; 2) the "unity of title" rule,
by which riparian rights extend to the entire tract held in common
ownership, no matter how acquired, at the time of the claim; and
3) that rule by which riparian land terminates at the outermost
8
edge of land described in a single entry.3
Judge Smith considered
all these tests arbitrary in a contest between a riparian and an
appropriator because "they ignore the historical development of
the two doctrines in Nebraska."3 9 Instead, he formulated two requirements that must be met in order for the land to achieve
riparian status. First, it must have been, by common-law standards,
riparian prior to 1895. And second, it must not have subsequently
lost its riparian status by severance.40 In other words, riparian
rights would extend only to the smallest tract held in one chain of
37

38
39

67 Neb. 325, 354, 93 N.W. 781, 791 (1903). In McGinley v. Platte Valley
Public Power & Irr. Dist., 133 Neb. 420, 275 N.W. 593 (1937), it
was held: "In a proceeding to condemn riparian land for public use,
consequential damages to other land of the owner in the same tract are
not limited to governmental sections a part of which is included in
the land actually taken, where depreciation in the value of the
remainder extends beyond those sections." Id. at 423, 275 N.W. at 595.
From this holding, it may be implied that the riparian lands would
extend beyond the government unit.
180 Neb. at 157, 141 N.W.2d at 744.

This criticism is taken from the impropriety of such tests in a litigation between two riparian proprietors. "The area or size of the parcel
is immaterial insofar as its character as riparian land is concerned."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 843, comment c at 326 (1939).
40 180 Neb. at 158, 144 N.W.2d at 745.

COMMENTS
title since 1895; and if the land loses its status subsequently by
severance, it cannot then be regained by reacquisition. Therefore,
to determine what is riparian land, examination of the complete
abstract of title is necessary.

V. BALANCING OF EQUITIES BETWEEN A RIPARIAN
AND AN APPROPRIATOR UNDER THE
WASSERBURGER DOCTRINE
Because basic conflicts are bound to arise in any jurisdiction
adopting the dual-system of riparian and appropriative rights, it
is essential to work out a method for deciding competing claims.
In Wasserburgerv. Coffee, 41 the conflicting claims were decided by
balancing the equities between the parties rather than preferring
appropriators vis-a-vis riparians, which had been the court's basic
prior philosophy.
In Wasserburger, plaintiffs were lower riparians using the
stream for watering their livestock; defendants were upstream
appropriators whose earliest appropriations were prior to any of
the plaintiffs' patents. Defendants' uses included irrigation of hay
meadows, and they had expended approximately $250,000 for construction and improvement of their irrigation facilities. By utilization of water for hay production they were able to support a cattle
herd of more than 5,000 head in winter pasture. The evidence
showed that without irrigation of the meadows defendants would
have been forced to reduce their herds by one-third to one-half.
Until 1959 the water either had been sufficient for both defendants and plaintiffs, or defendants released water upon request
whenever plaintiffs experienced any shortages downstream. However, there eventually occurred a substantial diminution of the
water supply, arising from a reduced waterflow and diversions by
the defendants. Consequently, the plaintiff-riparians, below, were
unable to support their livestock from the stream, and they then
brought an action to enjoin defendants from appropriating water
to their injury.
Plaintiffs had vested riparian rights to use the water because
their predecessors in title had acquired their patents prior to 1895.
These rights were in direct conflict with defendants' appropriations,
which were, according to prior decisions also vested rights superior
0 42
to subsequent riparian rights because of their priority in time.
41
42

180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966).
"[Tjhe conclusion appears to us irresistible that every appropriator
of water who has applied it to the beneficial uses contemplated by
these several acts has acquired a vested interest therein, which gives
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The fact that a riparian's rights are vested does not mean they
cannot be destroyed in certain instances. For instance, the court in
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway,43 which involved a plaintiff-appropriator, implied that such an appropriator (irrigation company) could
destroy vested riparian rights through the power of eminent
domain:
What the legislature has done with a view of promoting irrigation, as we understand and construe the different laws enacted
on the subject, is to... authorize the condemnation of the property
in and to the use of the waters belonging to riparian proprietors
whenever required in order that the whole of the waters of a
natural stream, when found necessary, may be used for irrigation
purposes. 44
However, in a later case, Vetter v. Broadhurst,45 the court restricted this broad statement by limiting the power of condemnation
to those entities operating for a "public purpose".
It may be thought to be rather an artificial distinction to say
that an irrigation district, or a canal company created to furnish
water to the landowners for agricultural purposes for compensation, may exercise the right of eminent domain, but that a private
owner of a single tract of land may not have such a privilege....
Such agencies are in a sense common carriers of water, and the
right of control and of regulation of rates exists in the public, so
that all courts would agree that such agencies are formed for a
public purpose.46
This "public purpose" was defined as an appropriation by an
entity which was established and operated so that the public actuwater rather than merely incurring an
ally shared in the use of the
4
indirect benefit therefrom. 7
him a superior title to the use of the water over the riparian proprietor
whose right has been acquired subsequent thereto. . .

43
44
45
46
47

."

Crawford Co.

v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 364, 93 N.W. 781, 794 (1903). "The two
doctrines stand side by side. They do not necessarily overthrow each
other, but one supplements the other. The riparian owner acquires
title to his usufructuary interest in the water when he appropriates
the land to which it is an incident, and when the right is once vested
it can not be divested except by some established rule of law. The
appropriator acquires title by appropriation and application to some
beneficial use, of which he can not be deprived except in some of the
modes prescribed by law. The time when either right accrues must
determine the superiority of title as between conflicting claimants."
Id. at 357, 93 N.W. at 792.
67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
Id. at 342, 93 N.W. at 786.
100 Neb. 356, 160 N.W. 109 (1916).
Id. at 363, 160 N.W. at 112.
Public purpose has no fixed definition; however, it is held that a
mere public interest does not constitute a public purpose. Burger v.
City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967).

COMMENTS
The court in Wasserburger seemed, at first, to disregard the
rationale of the Vetter decision in so far as it limited an individual

appropriator's power of condemnation. In the opinion, Judge Smith
stated the governing rule for determining whether the riparian
should be awarded a remedy for injury to his rights to be:
An appropriator who, in using water pursuant to a statutory
permit, intentionally causes substantial harm to a riparian proprietor, through invasion of the proprietor's interest in the use of
the water, is liable to the proprietor in an action for damages
if, but only if, the harmful appropriation is unreasonable in respect
to the proprietor. The appropriation is unreasonable unless its
utility outweighs the gravity of the harm.48
Two sections of the Restatement of Torts were cited as authority
for this proposition. However, the sections referred to refer to
actions between riparians; 9 they are inapplicable to a dispute
between a riparian and an appropriator. If Wasserburger had involved only riparians, the Restatement rule would be consistent
with the riparian doctrine since riparian rights are necessarily
flexible enough to conform to the doctrine of reasonable use,
whereas the quantity of water under appropriative rights remains
fixed under a statutory permit.50 In Wasserburger,however, both
parties were not riparians. Invoking equitable principles in such a
situation is highly questionable because, of course, the parties do
not have equal rights.

48

180 Neb. at 159, 141 N.W.2d at 745 (emphasis added). The rule for
damages prior to Wasserburger was as follows: "In order to entitle
the riparian owner to compensation, he must suffer an actual loss or
injury to the use of the water which the law recognizes as belonging
to him, and to deprive him of which is to take from him a substantial
property right. It is for an interference with or injury to his usufructuary estate in the water for which compensation may rightfully
be claimed where the water of the stream is diverted and appropriated
for the use of irrigation..

.

."

Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb.

325, 353, 93 N.W. 781, 790 (1903).
49 RESTATEMENT OF TonTs §§ 851-852 (1939). The gravity of the harm
by the appropriator is measured as follows: 1) The extent of harm;
2) the social value of the riparian use; 3) the time of initiation of
the riparian use; 4) the suitability of the riparian use; and 5) the
burden upon the riparian in avoiding the harm. The utility of the
appropriation is measured as follows: 1) The social value attached to
the appropriated use; 2) the priority of the appropriation; and 3) the
impracticability of avoiding the harm. Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180
Neb. 149, 159, 141 N.W.2d 738, 746 (1966).
50 "The flexibility of the one test opposes the rigidity of the other."
Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 159, 141 N.W.2d 738, 746 (1966).
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In a changing dual-system of water rights, in which a judicial
balancing of interests is essential when the basic doctrines are in
conflict, a utility rule as set forth by Judge Smith may be suitable.
But reading the rule apart from the actual holding of the case might
imply that an appropriator may condemn, by taking, a riparian's
rights without having to pay just compensation. If he is liable in
damages "if, but only if," his appropriation is unreasonable, then
he would be free from having to pay compensation whenever a
court would declare his use reasonable. This was not the law before
Wasserburger, and it probably is not now because if a riparian's
rights are vested property rights, then a taking, reasonable or
unreasonable, without compensation violates due process. It is
true that the riparian must suffer an actual loss to be entitled to
damages, 51 but this would only seem to go to show that there was in
fact a taking. And it is entirely possible that even though a riparian
could show actual damage, the appropriator's use would still be
reasonable. But if a taking can be shown, the riparian should be
entitled to damages whether the taking was reasonable or unreasonable.
Judge Smith perhaps foresaw such problems with the Restatement's rule and made certain there would be no broad misconstruction of the rule when he stated:
We cannot synthesize the two doctrines in one decision. Facts
are so important that in the absence of legislation a viable system
ought to be evolved by the process of inclusion and exclusion,
case by case. Here the conflicting claims are claims of private
right to uses for purposes of livestock water and of irrigation.
We5 2limit our broad outline of a system to the specific facts before
US.

Upon the facts, the court found the appropriator-defendants'
use was unreasonable. This gave rise to a cause of action for
damages which, as shown, existed under prior law. But it seems
only fortuitous that the outcome of the case would meet the
requirements of both prior law and the Restatement's rule. The
court enumerated this rule of balanced equities, or utility of harm,
in order to initiate a "viable" dual-system. However, since the court
recognizes the riparian right as property the rule cannot be invoked
as stated. Rather, damages will have to be awarded for any interference which amounts to a taking of those rights by an appropriator.
51 Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 353, 93 N.W. 781, 790 (1903).
See note 48 supra.
52 180 Neb. at 159, 141 N.W.2d at 745.

COMMENTS
VI. THE INJUNCTION AS A REMEDY FOR RIPARIANS
When vested riparian rights are destroyed or impaired by an
appropriation, the injured riparian is entitled to some remedy.
The distinction between the remedies of damages and injunction,
as applied to water rights, has not been based upon the common
doctrine that equity will enjoin only if there is no adequate remedy
at law. The Nebraska Supreme Court has centered its past decisions
on the overall benefit to the state in deciding whether to grant an
injunction or to limit relief to damages. Under this "beneficial
purpose" rationale it is conceivable that riparian land could have
been rendered worthless by an appropriation and yet only damages
would issue. Wasserburgerhas changed this so that now it depends
solely upon the equities of the parties as the court sees them.
The first case in which a riparian owner was denied the remedy
of an injunction against an appropriator was Clark v. Cambridge
& Arapahoe Irr. & Improvement Co.5 3 In that case, a lowerriparian-mill operator, prior in time, sought to enjoin an upperappropriator-irrigator from diverted water according to his appropriation. The court refused the injunction, but did so on the theory
that the plaintiff was barred by laches. This was said to be an even
stronger defense when the defendant was engaged in a work of
public interest.
In Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 4 where a subsequent upperappropriator brought an action to enjoin a prior lower-riparian
from tearing down a diversion dam, the court discussed at great
length the rights and remedies available in conflicts between
riparians and appropriators. The court allowed an injunction to
issue against the riparian. On the riparian's cross-petition, however, the appropriator's irrigation was prohibited until adequate
damages were paid to the riparian owner by the appropriator. The
court felt that damages were an adequate remedy for the riparian,
and that by only allowing damages, the state would still benefit by
the appropriation for irrigation. Such a taking, by appropriation,
was held to be contemplated by the enabling statutes. This interpretation of the appropriation acts provided a method to develop
arid or semiarid land by applying stream waters "to the more
useful and beneficial purposes of fructifying the soil for the comfort
and blessing of mankind." 55

45 Neb. 798, 64 N.W. 239 (1895).
N.W. 781 (1903).
55 Id. at 350, 93 N.W. at 789.
53

54 67 Neb. 325, 93
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The next important case was McCook Irr.& Water Power Co. v.
Crews,56 in which a prior lower-appropriator was granted an injunction against a subsequent upper-riparian-irrigator. The court stated
that such a holding did not mean that the riparian's right to irrigate
was destroyed. It simply meant that this private right should be
subordinated, and, when required for public use, taken by eminent
domain.5 7 Riparian rights were subject to condemnation for the
purpose of appropriating water for irrigation, a public use by an
irrigation company. Therefore, since the appropriator's rights were
superior to the riparian's, 58 it could enjoin the riparian; or, in a suit
by the riparian, the appropriator could resist an injunction. The
Crews case was clear since, under the priority of time test, the
appropriator's rights were superior.
Finally, in Cline v. Stock 59 a prior riparian-manufacturer was
denied an injunction against diversions by subsequent appropriatorirrigators. The court decided that the appropriator had acquired
superior rights. If the appropriator carried out his permit in the
manner allowed "a lower riparian owner could not enjoin the
continued use of such water, but must rely upon his action at law
to recover such damages, if any, as he might sustain.... ."60
Nevertheless, riparians argue that Vetter v. Broadhurst6" gives
them a right to an injunction against private appropriators. Vetter
was an eminent domain proceeding in which the plaintiff, an individual farmer, sought to condemn defendant's land for a reservoir
to be used for irrigation purposes under his appropriation permit.
The court denied the condemnation on the ground that it was not
for a public purpose because the plaintiff was an individual rather
than an irrigation company, and a private individual is incapable
of appropriating for a public purpose. 62 However, one could imply,
as it seems the court in Wasserburger did, that if the plaintiff had
gone ahead with the reservoir, the defendant could have enjoined
him from inundating his land.
The court, in Wasserburger,used the rationale of the Vetter
case to distinguish the prior cases, Clark, McCook and Cline, from
the facts present in Wasserburger: "We think that these cases have
58
57

70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249 (1905), rev'g. on rehearing, 70 Neb. 109, 96
N.W. 996 (1903).
Id. at 121, 102 N.W. at 251.

58 Id. at 118, 102 N.W. at 251.
59 71 Neb. 79, 102 N.W. 265 (1904).

60 Id. at 81, 102 N.W. at 266.
61 100 Neb. 356, 160 N.W. 109 (1916).
62

See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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been misread.... Defendants are private appropriators-not cham'
pions of the public interest."6
The court said that the appropriators
in Clark, McCook and Cline were irrigation companies offering a
public service, in good faith and at great cost. It might be noted,
however, that in the Cline case some of the appropriators were
private individuals, not public corporations.6 Therefore, the court
has been ignoring a fact directly bearing upon the distinguishing
factor in the case.
It was argued in Wasserburger that the appropriators made
their appropriations at great expense without the riparians bringing any action, when they surely should have realized that a water
shortage would leave them without an adequate supply. But laches
were never referred to in the opinion. This may have been because
the court felt that, as with a prescriptive right, the riparians did
not need to commence an action until there was a use so adverse
to their own as to deprive them of vested rights. It is unknown
whether the court took all this into consideration in its balancing
of the equities; however, it may be irrelevant in light of the free
discretion left to the court in determining priorities in the dualsystem. In fact, under the broad powers of equity, the court allowed
the injunction "without approving any interpretation of the permits
or defining
domestic use under the Constitution and the common
65
law."

The test formulated for the determination of the suitability of
an injunction was that used in enjoining an ordinary tort. It is
submitted that it is illogical to speak in terms of tort when dealing
with a system of water rights such as regulated judicially in Nebraska. Except in extremely patent situations, one would have
great difficulty knowing whether he were committing a tort against
another party without having his uses adjudicated under the tests
set forth in Wasserburger. This situation gives rise to the dominant
problem of unpredictability, and irrigator-private-appropriators
may be unwilling to expend large sums of money to divert water
in reliance upon a Department of Water Resources' permit if there
is any possibility of detriment to riparian owners. Appropriators
may be willing to compensate riparians for damages to vested
rights, but injunctions against large diversions could be disastrous. In a specific case, the court would probably take this into
consideration, but Wasserburger does not make it absolutely clear
that it would do so.
Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 162, 141 N.W.2d 738, 747 (1966).
64 See Brief for Appellant for Rehearing at 13, Wasserburger v. Coffee,
180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966).
6

65 180 Neb. at 164, 141 N.W.2d at 748.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

Some of the problems that may arise because of the decision in
Wasserburger have been shown. What the ideal distribution of
rights under this dual-system is, while it remains judicially regulated, is unanswerable. It may be that the court in Wasserburger
approached the best method of distributing water rights under this
system. The fact remains that there are problems created which
must be faced in the future. One solution may be an appropriation
of the water of the state by the state itself. It seems certain the
state would be constitutionally required to compensate riparian
owners, who would have no right to injunctive relief. But until
the legislature enacts total regulation of water development, allocation and use, the court will continue to struggle with problems of
distribution under Nebraska's dual-system.
George Rozmarin '69

